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This paper analyzes the impact of fishing effort coordination and revenue pooling 
arrangement on overall returns from fishery comanagement. Using the survey data collected 
from the Japanese fishery management organizations (FMOs) in 2005, we focused on two 
management measures employed by FMOs: fishing effort coordination and revenue pooling 
arrangement. We found that FMOs with both effort coordination and pooling arrangement 
outperformed those with neither or only with either one. The specific activities that these 
FMOs are engaged in that had positive impacts on their economic performance include 
marketing and harvest control. Marketing in general had a significant positive effect for 
FMOs with both measures, but we also found that no single specific marketing activity 
is a silver bullet, suggesting that the specifics vary from case to case. Our analysis provides 
a hint of what a fishery comanagement group can do in order to be successful in their 
management effort.
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1. Introduction
Collective management in fisheries has garnered much attention in recent years 
as an alternative to conventional top-down regulations and completely decentralized scheme 
such as individual transferable quotas. While the definition of collective management?or 
comanagement-differs across the literature (Jentoft, 2003), the key feature here is that local 
fishermen form a group to jointly manage the common pool resource they exploit. It can 
take various forms, including harvester cooperatives in Alaska, sector allocations in New 
England (Johnston and Sutinen, 2009) and fishery cooperative communities in South Korea 
(MOMAF, 2007).
Collective fishery management as a scheme is anything but new. It is rather the 
norm in artisanal fisheries (Jentoft, 2003) and there are many examples of fishery comanage-
ment around the world (Wilson, Nielsen and Dengbol, 2003; Cunningham and Bostock, 
2005; Townsend, Shotton and Uchida, 2008). There is an abundance of literature attempting 
to synthesize the lessons learned from these case studies, not just in fisheries but in the 
context of common pool resources in general (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Ostrom et al., 2002). Some of the key lessons listed in these literatures include 
the importance of well defined boundaries, homogeneous member characteristics, immobile 
resource, conflict resolution mechanisms and so on. What seems to be lacking in these 
lists, however, is what these comanagement groups can do as part of their daily fishing 
operations and institutional arrangements that may lead to the success of the comanagement.
Examining fishery comanagement in the coastal fisheries of Japan provides some 
valuable lessons. The advantage of studying Japanese fishery comanagement is their abun-
dance and variety of cooperatives. These cooperatives function under the same national 
fishery rules and laws and, to certain extent, their cultural and social characteristics are 
identical. This enables us to utilize wide variations in key fishery-related variables while 
controlling for other influential and difficult-to-observe disturbances. There are several stud-
ies examining the framework, both institutional and legal, of Japanese fishery comanagement 
(e.g., Cancino, Uchida and Wilen, 2007). However, our focus is on the “software” of coma-
nagement and there are two basic and important components of fishery comanagement for 
its success: effort coordination and pooling arrangement (Uchida, 2009).
There are several important questions about the actual relationships and interactions 
between effort coordination and pooling arrangements employed by the FMOs. In the liter-
ature, pooling arrangements are thought of as supporting systems that help effort coordina-
tion operations function effectively (Gaspart and Seki, 2003; Hasegawa, 1985; Baba, 1991). 
However, the literature on this topic is drawn from a few select cases and does not provide 
cross-sectional overview of how these schemes are actually employed and how they perform. 
Whether effort coordination and pooling arrangements bring higher economic returns in 
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the first place is an empirical question that may be important to sustainable fishery 
comanagement. Effort coordination and pooling arrangements can potentially change the 
way fishermen do fishing by replacing individualistic competition (race to fish) with behav-
ior more similar to a corporate or sole owner style of operation. But making such operational 
and institutional changes involves long negotiations and, once implemented, a level of mon-
itoring and enforcement effort, which all mount to significant total costs. Since fisheries 
are no different than any other economic activities, it is vital that implementation of these 
arrangements bring higher economic return for successful fishery comanagement. Some 
of the key questions are: Are effort coordination and pooling arrangement generally em-
ployed as a pair? Is the performance better when effort coordination and pooling arrange-
ments perform better if they are implemented together rather than individually? If so, in 
what ways are such outcome achieved? The main contribution of this paper is to provide 
answers to these questions.
Our results show that members of FMOs with both effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements had higher economic performance, defined as the revenue per fishing hour, 
than FMOs with either one or neither of these arrangements. FMOs with only effort coordi-
nation or pooling arrangements had positive estimated impact on the economic performance 
but statistically insignificant compared to FMOs with neither feature, which highlights the 
importance of having both implemented. We also found that among various management 
activities that FMOs are engaged in, marketing and harvesting control had the most impact 
on economic performance.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will briefly explain 
what are effort coordination and pooling arrangement and why and how they are important 
in fishery comanagement. The following section describes the data used for our analysis, 
followed by the section on empirical strategies employed. Section on estimation results 
will follow and the last section concludes.
2. Effort coordination and pooling arrangement
Coastal fishery management in Japan is, for the most part, carried out by the 
local fishermen’s group known as Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA). Members of 
FCAs are mostly fishing households and “small” companies, as defined by the number 
of employees and gross tonnage of the vessels owned. The functions of FCAs are similar 
to other harvester cooperatives and include joint purchases of inputs (e.g., fuel, ice and 
boxes), administration of ex-vessel markets and provision of insurance and credit to 
members. FCAs are usually associated with specific coastal communities that historically 
have depended on fisheries resources. Each FCA typically encompasses all the fisheries 
within that community or communities’ jurisdiction. A number of diverse fisheries?both 
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in terms of targeted species and gear used?may be under the auspices of any FCA.
In addition to conventional functions, FCAs play the unique role of managing 
fishing rights. Fishing rights are defined over a parcel of coastal water, typically in front 
of the community which an FCA belongs. The borders are defined often by the municipal 
boundaries then extending certain distance from the shore. The extent of the boundaries 
from the coast depends partly on the topology of ocean floor and neighboring communities. 
Fishing rights are granted and protected by law and restricts commercial fishing to only 
the permitted members of an FCA. In this sense, fishing rights is analogous to territorial 
use rights for fishing (TURFs) (Christy, 1982).2
Comanagement of coastal fisheries is carried out by fishery management organ-
izations (FMOs). An FMO is defined by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
as a group of fishers who share the same fishing ground and/or operate in the same fishery 
and are collectively engaged in resource and/or harvest management according to mutually 
agreed rules. FMOs are autonomous organizations and some of Japan’s FMOs have been 
in operation for decades. Since it was placed at the center of national fishery management 
policy in the early 1980s, the number of FMOs continues to rise, with 1,608 FMOs nation-
wide by, 2003 (MAFF, 2006). FMOs and FCAs are interrelated in number of ways: nearly 
95% of FMOs are operated by a parent FCA or its affiliate organization. As such, the 
operation of FMOs are supported and utilizing the institutional infrastructures of FCAs 
and fishing rights.
FMOs and their associated FCAs and fishing rights are all institutional framework 
under which fishery comanagement groups operate. For FMOs to be successful, they must 
at minimum generate tangible benefits to the participating members that surpass not only 
the status quo but those of non-participants.3 The question is how to achieve such an out-
come in the context of fishery comanagement. While there could be numerous activities 
and ways of doing business that would achieve this goal, we claim that they can be put 
into two very broad components: effort coordination and pooling arrangement.
Effort coordination involves individual fishing operations that are coordinated with 
the goal of increasing the efficiency of the overall fishing effort. This includes, but is 
not limited to, eliminating the race-to-fish incentive and avoiding congestion at fishing 
grounds, which also reduces potential damage and loss of fishing gear. Typical methods 
employed to achieve these objectives are fishing-ground rotations and/or assignments, alter-
nating fishing days, joint searches/assessments of fish stocks and joint ownership of vessels 
and fishing gear.
2 The fishing rights apply only to coastal fisheries; offshore and high-sea fisheries are typically governed by 
a license system that is managed by either the central or the prefectural government. Also, there are three 
types of fishing rights-common, demarcated and large fixed net. For the context of this paper, common fishing 
right is the only relevant one.
3 This is referred to as privilege condition in the club theory literature (Sandler, 1992).
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Consider, for example, the fishing ground rotation. In white shrimp fishery, an 
FMO implemented a daily fishing ground rotation scheme (Platteau and Seki, 2001). FMO 
members and known fishing grounds were grouped into three, each FMO group is assigned 
to one fishing ground and they rotated daily when they went out fishing. If the group 
size is appropriately determined congestion in each fishing ground will be mitigated, if 
not eliminated and because there is no need to compete for better fishing grounds there 
is considerably low incentive to race to fish. Cost savings can come from slower steaming 
speed that increases fuel efficiency and less damage on fishing gear due to less congestion.
In small pink shrimp fishery fishing grounds are not rotated but assigned by the 
“fishing committee” that meets every day during the season (Uchida and Baba, 2008). This 
shrimp is a small zooplankton-like species that concentrates each evening as they rise near 
the surface, but the location where the clumps appear is highly variable. Rigid rotation 
system may be ill-suited in such condition because while one group might find near-empty 
ground another group might find overwhelming amount of shrimp. In fact, it often happens 
that some vessels with large catch radio the leader for help. The leader will then direct 
vessels with low catch to relocate and help haul the harvest or make additional tows nearby. 
Location assignment system allows such flexibility to be in place.
Effort coordination is not only applicable to the production operations; collective 
marketing is potentially an effective way to increase revenue and it is becoming increasingly 
popular among FMOs. Often seen is the development of private brand that is as simple 
as being explicit about the geographical origin (e.g., Maine lobster, Alaskan salmon). Others, 
particularly the successful ones, involve more coordinated effort in quality control and tar-
geted marketing.
A pooling arrangement is an agreement among FMO members by which harvests, 
revenues and/or profits are pooled and then distributed back to members.4 The redistribution 
rule is either uniform (all participating fishing units receive the same amount) or weighted 
by indicators such as vessel size and number of crew members. Pooling arrangement is 
typically characterized as a supporting mechanism for effort coordination (Platteau and Seki, 
2001). This is because, in essence, effort coordination is a restriction of individual’s deci-
sions and the differentials in harvest levels resulting from effort coordination must be ad-
dressed and adjusted (Uchida, 2009). A pooling arrangement is a method for handling this 
differential problem.
It is important to recognize, however, the importance of the fact that pooling ar-
rangement breaks the link between the individual fishing effort applied and actual earnings 
received. This dampens the incentive to compete aggressively, which is favorable in light 
of the excessive fishing effort that is applied in the absence of comanagement. It also 
aligns the incentive of individual fishermen to that of a group; individual return is maximized 
4 Pooling arrangements considered here do not include insurance purposes, as in risk pooling, since such fishery 
insurance is already offered by FCAs.
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only when the group’s total return is maximized. This implies, for example, that it becomes 
an individual’s own interest to avoid flooding the market and depressing the market price, 
which would lead to voluntary restraining of harvests. However, a pooling arrangement 
is a double-edged sword: if the incentive-dampening effect goes too far, shirking problems 
can undermine the FMO’s stability. Number of case studies show that FMOs with pooling 
arrangements are functioning reasonably well (Hasegawa, 1985; Baba, 1991; Platteau and 
Seki, 2001; Gaspart and Seki, 2003; Uchida and Baba, 2008; Uchida and Watanobe, 2008). 
That said, the higher economic return from comanagement, particularly when that manage-
ment includes a pooling arrangement, is critical in sustaining the comanagement regime.
Not all FMOs have effort coordination or pooling arrangement. According to the 
fishery census, about 12% of FMOs have pooling arrangement (MAFF, 2006). While the 
data on effort coordination per se is not included in the census, one indicative data is 
that approximately 50% of FMOs have joint marketing program of one form or another. 
These facts raise a question of what characteristics of FMOs might be influencing their 
decision to implement effort coordination and pooling arrangement. Using the survey data 
collected by the author this paper will analyze and identify those characteristics.
3. Data
Since there were no readily available datasets investigating effort coordination in 
the detail that we required, a mail survey was developed and implemented. The survey 
was targeted at FMO managers nationwide and was implemented in 2005 following the 
Dillman method (Dillman, 1978). The survey was pre-tested and then mailed out in late 
2005.5
One of the first challenges in conducting the mail survey was to identify which 
FMOs to send the survey. Ideally we would want to send the survey to all FMOs nationwide, 
but it became apparent that this was not possible. The main complication is that there 
exists no single source of contact information for all of Japan’s FMOs, primarily due to 
the fact that FMOs are typically autonomous organizations (Makino and Matsuda, 2005). 
An option was to send the survey to all fishery cooperatives (FCAs) for which contact 
information is available. However, there are many cases where two or more FMOs are 
formed within a single fishery cooperative and we were advised that a survey sent to a 
5 Our survey was not the first one to be conducted on FMOs or on effort coordination. For example, in 1997 
there was a survey conducted under the supervision of the Fishery Agency of the Japanese government. That 
survey was sent to regional government officers associated with FMOs located within various jurisdictions, 
who then answered the survey on behalf of FMOs. Our survey differs from the previous ones in two important 
ways: i) our survey was sent directly to FMO managers instead of government officials who oversee them 
and ii) questions were focused in great detail on effort coordination, pooling arrangements and other self-im-
posed regulations and fishing operations in general.
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generic recipient (i.e., not to specific FMOs) would tend to get less or no attention. For 
these reasons it became clear that we needed to have a list of specific contact information 
of FMOs, which led us to utilize the list of FMOs from a prior survey conducted in 1997 
(see footnote 4). 386 surveys were sent out and 113 usable responses were received.
We defined “effort coordination” as i) fishing grounds rotation or location assign-
ments and/or ii) exchanging information on fishing grounds. Table 1 shows the number 
of FMOs in our sample identified by the combination of effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements employed. There are significant numbers of FMOs with either effort coordina-
tion (Type B) or pooling arrangements (Type C) alone. This suggests that these arrangements 
are probably not simply transitional or exceptional institutions. Having both effort coordina-
tion and pooling arrangements as a pair (Type A) is not necessarily a norm and the question 
becomes whether there is a significant benefit of having both. Type D is defined as FMOs 
without either of the two effort coordination or pooling arrangements.
Table 1. Number of surveyed FMOs by their type
Type Effort coordination Pooling arrangement Count
A x x 38
B x  28
C  x 18
D   29
Total   113
       Notes : Count is the number of FMOs of respective types in the survey sample.
Our primary interest is determining how various combinations of effort coordina-
tion and pooling arrangement affect some economic performance measure. We focus on 
the revenue per unit of effort, which is defined as the revenue from the managed fisheries 
per member per fishing hour. The overall unconditional mean of revenue per unit of effort 
in our sample was 94.9 thousand yen (about $860) with significant variance among the 
FMO-types ranging from 160.3 thousand yen ($1,500) for Type A to 4.3 thousand yen 
($40) for Type D (Table 2). Note that these figures are gross revenues before subtracting 
any expenses such as vessel maintenance, wages for crew and usage fees for shore-side 
facilities. Nevertheless, from these summary statistics alone, there seems to be a good reason 
to believe that FMOs with effort coordination and pooling arrangements have higher revenue 
per unit of effort than FMOs without these arrangements. Indeed, simple -tests among the 
means indicate that the Type A FMOs’ performance measure is statistically different from 
Type B and D, but not so from Type C. Type B FMOs’ revenues per fisherman day was 
statistically significant only from Type D, while that was not the case between Type C 
and Type D. This is weakly suggestive of the notion that effort coordination and pooling 
arrangements are more productive when implemented together. However, we would need 
to control for other factors affecting the revenue level to be more confident in this claim.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of survey sample data
Variables
FMO Type
A B C D
Average membership size 49.8 48.1 28.4 73.7
Average members age 55.6 59.6 59.7 59.4
Average years of experience 31.6 34.2 32.6 30.5
Average number of vessels registered 35.4 39.7 26.2 84.7
Average number of vessels in operation 15.4 19.9 21.9 29.1
Average vessel tonnage 9.2 3.7 3.8 6.1
Average per member revenue 9,833 5,337 5,388 3,027
Average number of fishing days per year 66.0 118.9 92.6 120.2
Average fishing hours per day 5.3 5.0 4.6 10.6
Revenue per fishing effort 102.1 10.4 12.6 3.7
Fishing ground within TURF (% of “yes”) 87.8 85.2 80.0 85.7
Solely owned TURF (% of “yes”) 66.7 43.5 62.5 58.8
Type of managed targeted species: pelagic 0.0 6.9 8.3 12.5
Groundfish 14.0 20.7 8.3 4.2
Crustacean 23.2 31.0 25.0 12.5
Sedentary 62.8 41.4 58.3 70.8
Notes : Monetary unit is in thousand Japanese yen.
One of the distinctive differences among FMO-types is the number of fishing days 
per year. Most notably, Type A FMO members spend far less time fishing than Type B 
or Type D FMO members. Table 2 seem to suggest that FMOs with pooling arrangements 
(Type A and C) tend to fish fewer days than the other two types. This is intuitive, since 
under the pooling arrangement there is less incentive to go out fishing in bad weather, 
for example, in comparison with behavior under individualistic competition. On the other 
hand, members of Type B FMOs are not under the environment of individualistic competi-
tion, but their numbers of fishing days are the same level as Type D FMOs. A possible 
explanation for this result is the “fairness adjustments” in response to effort coordination. 
With effort coordination such adjustments must be made, such as by providing equal chances 
of fishing at any given fishing ground to a vessel in a season (as observed in walleye 
pollack fishery in northern Japan; see Uchida and Watanobe, 2008 for details). This equity 
constraint may translate to maintaining a certain minimum days of fishing per year since 
it is easier to make such adjustments with more fishing days
Fishing hours per fishing day are not much different across FMO-types except 
Type D, which on average exhibits much longer fishing hours per day. This suggests that 
fishing effort may be more concentrated, presumably around the most profitable times, 
in Type A and perhaps Type C FMOs.
If Type A FMOs are earning higher revenue per unit of effort, one might expect 
that, ceteris paribus, i) membership size of these FMOs are smaller than other types (e.g., 
Agrawal, 2001) and ii) FMOs would successfully attract younger generation (i.e., successors) 
Fishing effort coordination and revenue pooling arrangement in fishery
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to the fishery. Regarding the first point, Type A through Type C FMOs have smaller mem-
bership sizes than Type D, but Type A is certainly not the smallest. The average age of 
FMO members is lower for Type A but not significantly so and the same is true for average 
years of experience as a fisherman. Thus, the two hypotheses above are not supported 
by our sample.
According to the literature such as Ostrom et al. (2002), self governance has better 
chance of success if the managed resource is sedentary. Our survey sample shows the 
consistent trend, where the majority of FMOs of all types manage sedentary species. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that none of the Type A FMOs manage pelagic fish species, 
which is considered to be the least suitable for resource self governance. The high share 
of crustacean species could be the effect of their higher value in general; species such 
as spiny lobster and many types of crabs tend to fetch higher price in the market. High 
valued species could provide an extra incentive to manage well so as to sustain the fishery.
4. Empirical model
We are interested in whether there are any systematic differences between the 
revenue per unit of effort () and the FMO-types. Our objective is to determine how 
much we can attribute this variation to the difference in management regimes.
Simply establishing a TURF-based fishery cooperative does not eliminate the in-
centive to race to fish (Uchida, 2004). New entries will be limited but, if nothing else 
is done, the race among the incumbents will prevail, leading to a waste of capital, low 
profitability and overall depletion of the resource and economic rents. The simple establish-
ment of an FMO will not be much different either, unless other actions are taken by FMO 
members. With an FMO, the authority of fishery management devolves from the officials 
to the local fishermen. This decentralization may improve the level of compliance, but 
since underlying incentives to race for fish are unaffected without additional measures, 
the impact of such a regime shift on economic outcomes is likely to be limited. 
We hypothesized that FMOs with effort coordination and/or pooling arrangements 
(Type A, B, or C) will have higher revenue per unit of effort than those without such 
arrangements implemented (Type D). Successful fishery comanagement requires that a re-
stricted group be granted rights to the resource. This is what establishment of the TURF 
provides. But successful comanagement also requires that the restricted group that has been 
granted rights can successfully overcome internal organization costs and collectively exercise 
policies that manage the resource sustainably and profitably. Effort coordination is an active 
management measure that may be used to fulfill this requirement. Pooling arrangements, 
in contrast, can be thought of as passive measures in the sense that they do not require 
fishermen to continuously decide on terms of operation. However, pooling arrangements 
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alter the incentive structures in such a way that, if implemented appropriately, individual 
incentives are aligned with that of a group as a whole. This is because maximizing the 
total benefit of a group, i.e., the whole “pie”, will also maximize one’s individual dividend 
under the pooling arrangement. 
We would also expect that FMOs with both effort coordination and pooling ar-
rangements (Type A) to exhibit higher revenues per unit of effort than those with only 
either one (Type B or C). Effort coordination deals with the allocation of inputs of harvesting 
operation, while pooling arrangements deal with the allocation of outputs among the FMO 
members. Intuitively, coordinating and pooling complement each other and we would expect 
FMOs with both to be more efficient and effective.
The following simple regression was conducted to check quantitatively whether 
the FMO-types matter at all. The model is 
where Type_A through Type_C are as defined in Table 1 and εi is the error term. The 
subscript i denotes an FMO. Note that the Type D FMO variable is excluded from the 
estimation. The result from heteroskedasticity-robust OLS shows that Type A and Type 
B FMOs have significantly higher revenue per unit of effort than Type D FMOs (Table 
3). Thus, it seems suggestive at this junction that FMO-types do have influence over the 
revenue per unit of effort; the next step is to control for other covariates that affect revenue 
per unit of effort.
Other influential factors that may impact revenues per unit of effort need to be 
controlled for. These include targeted species-type, product-type (which product markets 
the harvest is allocated to) and the vessel size. In addition, membership size of an FMO 
might also be an influencing factor. Literature on commons and collective action often 
claim that smaller groups have better chances for successful collective action, in terms 
of sustainability and performance (Agrawal, 2001). Therefore, smaller FMOs might have 
higher revenue per unit of effort, ceteris paribus. Lastly, there could be a learning effect. 
Table 3.  Heteroskedasticity-robust OLS with only FMO-type variables
Variable Coefficient
Type A 1.813 (4.70)***
Type B 0.711 (1.97)*
Type C 0.781 (1.34)
Constant -1.324 (5.17)***
Adjusted R2 0.165 
 Notes : Absolute t-values in parentheses. Number of observations in this regression is 72.
*** significant at 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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The hypothesis is that the longer an FMO endures, the better it is in management 
performance. This is a plausible hypothesis given anecdotal evidence of actual cases where 
FMOs often modify and fine-tune their management practices over time (Uchida, 2004).
4.1 Targeted species-types
It is common knowledge that certain harvested species command higher prices 
than other species in general. In Japan, for example, spiny lobsters and certain species 
of crabs (e.g., snow crabs) are generally considered high-end or luxury foods and thus 
are traded at higher prices. Thus, we would need to control for FMOs’ main targeted species. 
One needs to be cautious in including the species-type variables into the model. 
If the case was such that high-value species are caught dominantly by Type A FMOs and 
low-value species are caught dominantly by Type D FMOs, or vice versa, then including 
both FMO-type and species-type variables will cause serious multicollinearity problems. 
To see if this problem exists in our sample, we counted the number of FMOs by targeted 
species and by FMO-types. There were total of 66 species targeted in our sample, with 
most of them having only three or fewer FMOs involved. Our focus is the “popular” targeted 
species and thus we separated species with seven or more FMOs involved. Also, since 
abalone and turban shell were often harvested as a pair of targeted species, these two were 
treated as one species entry. The results showed that there are no systematic correlations 
between FMO-type and species-type variables and hence we include the species-type varia-
bles into the model.
4.2 Product-types
The revenue level can potentially be influenced by the market-types to which har-
vested fish are sold. Fish designated to fresh markets generally fetch higher prices than 
those going to frozen or processed markets. Freshness is of particular importance for 
Japanese consumers as there is substantial demand for raw consumption of fish. Whether 
that translates into higher revenue, however, is an empirical question. Nonetheless, im-
plementing rigorous quality control measures so as to allocate their harvest to raw and 
fresh consumption is a popular practice that FMOs engage in. This is in line with the 
claim that benefit of rationalized fishery management coming from output markets in terms 
of increased price is substantial and critical in sustaining the regime (Homans and Wilen, 
2005; Herrmann, 1996).
We will denote the different markets which harvest is designated to as “product- 
type.” First we divided the product-type into two categories: domestic consumption, includ-
ing both final and intermediate and exports.6 Domestic consumption was further sub-catego-
rized into raw, fresh, processed and feed. The first two are for final consumption.
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It is not uncommon that a single species is allocated to multiple markets. For 
this reason, the survey asked the respondents to give the share of each product-type. Overall, 
the majority of harvests go to either raw or fresh markets, with average of 27.7% going 
to the raw market and 56.9% to the fresh market.
4.3 Gear-types
Another factor that might affect the revenue level is the harvest method employed, 
particularly within a single species-type. Controlling for gear-type is clearly necessary if 
there are multiple gear-types employed for the same targeted species and that there is a 
reason to believe that might have an impact on revenue level. We examined the top two 
gear-types used to harvest the popular targeted species.7 Results showed that the issue of 
multiple gear-types in a single species is quite limited. With an exception of turban shell, 
all other species are harvested by single gear-types across different FMOs. As for turban 
shell, since it is often combined with the abalone fishery, diving can be considered as 
the dominant harvesting method for the two species. From these results, we conclude that 
including both species-type and gear-types variables will likely to cause multicollinearity 
problems, thus gear-type variables were excluded from the estimation models.
4.4 Other variables
There are other variables that can potentially be included in the model. An obvious 
one is the average tonnage of vessels. This is the average tonnage of vessels owned by 
FMO members and it is intended to be a proxy for crew member size. Intuitively, larger 
crew sizes bring higher revenues for an FMO member, who is typically a vessel owner 
and skipper, per fishing hour. Since we do not have the crew size variable, we include 
the average tonnage of vessels based on the assumption that typically larger vessels have 
more crew members on board.
A few more variables are considered primarily in response to the possible issue 
of endogeneity. Specifically, we are concerned about any omitted variables that not only 
affect the level of per member revenue but also the likelihood of a group choosing a partic-
ular FMO type.8 One of such variable is the FMO’s membership size. As Ostrom (1990) 
6 According to the fisheries white paper, during the 2004 fiscal year the domestic fishery production was 1,604 
billion yen, of which 148 billion yen or 9.2% was exported (Fishery Agency, 2005).
7 First we tried to count the top three gear-types, but turned out that there was no third popular gear-type in 
our sample.
8 We do not have a selection bias issue here; we have observations on revenue for all four types of FMOs 
and we know exactly which revenue data belongs to which FMO-type. Also, since our sample is confined 
within FMOs we cannot address the question of what factors determine the establishment of FMOs.
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and others have pointed out, smaller groups have better chance of implementing collective 
action and perhaps more sophisticated forms of collective action than larger groups, ceteris 
paribus. This suggests that group size affects the choice of FMO types; smaller groups 
tend toward being Type A. 
In addition to membership size, we considered the FMOs’ established year index 
variable. This variable range from 1 to 11, each corresponding to an interval of five years 
where 1 is the oldest (established on year 1935 and prior) and 11 is the most recent (established 
year, 2001 and after).8 The question is whether any learning effect is present or not. Also, 
it is often the case that FMOs modify and in many cases fine-tune their management schemes 
and rules over time. We would expect that such modifications take place in aim to increase 
the return from the fishery, because making such changes incur cost.
4.5 Model specification
All of the aforementioned covariates were considered to be included in our empiri-
cal model. It was revealed, however, that inclusion of both species-type and product-type 
variables exhibited a typical sign of multicollinearity: high adjusted R2, a significant F-test 
and non-significant t-tests of coefficients. We thus conclude that species-type and prod-
uct-type variables should not be included together in our estimation model. Upon comparing 
the models with species-type and product-type variables, it was determined to retain the 
species-type variables in our empirical model.
We also considered specifications such as double-log (replacing tonnage, member-
ship size and years variables with the logarithm of respective variables) and inclusion of 
squared terms for tonnage, membership size and years variables. Furthermore, interaction 
terms of FMO types and tonnage, membership size and years variables were considered 
to examine whether the effects of these variables differ across FMO types. The goodness 
of fit of these models were compared based on the F-values and adjusted R2. In conclusion, 
our basic empirical model is
(1)
where subscript i denotes an FMO,      and  is a vector of species-type as 
listed in Table 4. Regression diagnostics were performed to detect any influential outliers 
in our sample but none among the 67 observations was found; details are explained in 
the appendix.




The coefficient estimate of the Type A FMO variable is 1.19 and it is statistically 
significant at 1% level (Table 4). Since only the dependent variable is in a natural log 
form, the interpretation of coefficients is the percentage change in revenue per unit of 
effort in response to a unit change in explanatory variables. Thus, it is estimated that a 
member of Type A FMOs earn approximately 118% more revenue per unit of effort than 
Table 4.  Heteroskedastic-robust OLS model with RPUE as dependent variable
Variables  Estimated Coefficient
FMO typea
Type A 1.189 (2.247)***
Type B 0.425 (0.456)
Type C 1.961 (1.703)*
Species typeb
Spiny lobster 0.097 (0.143)
Abalone and turban shell -0.315 (0.767)
Scallop 1.756 (5.927)***
Asari-clam -0.412 (0.534)
Other migratory fish -0.479 (1.441)
Other non-migratory fish 2.250 (3.937)***
Other sedentary species 1.927 (4.428)***
FMO membership size -0.00002 (0.003)
Average vessel tonnage 0.155 (2.506)**
Years since FMO establishment 0.0203 (0.212)
Type A x membership size -0.003 (0.331)
Type A x tonnage -0.166 (2.684)***
Type A x years -0.071 (0.563)
Type B x membership size 0.028 (2.600)**
Type B x tonnage -0.018 (0.206)
Type B x years -0.285 (1.959)*
Type C x membership size 0.017 (1.511)
Type C x tonnage -0.998 (7.473)***
Type C x years -0.003 (0.020)
Constant  -1.797 (3.554)***
Adjusted R2  0.549
Number of observations 67
Notes : a, Type D FMO is set as the base FMO-type.
b, Surf clam is set as the base species-type.
Absolute t-values in parenthesis. Significance levels are indicated by *** significant at 1%, ** 5% 
and * 10%.
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the Type D FMO members. This is within the plausible range based on the result from 
the descriptive statistics (Table 2). The model also estimates that Type A FMO members 
earns significantly, in a statistical sense, higher revenue per unit of effort than Type B 
FMO member at 5% significance level. Such was not the case, however, between Type 
A and Type C. In addition, estimated coefficients of Type B and Type C were not sig-
nificantly different from each other. 
The results show that Type A and Type C FMO members earn significantly higher 
revenue per unit of effort compared to Type D FMO members, with much stronger sig-
nificance for Type A FMOs. This suggests that (1) combining effort coordination and pool-
ing arrangement has super-additive impact on revenue per unit of effort, while (2) effort 
coordination or pooling arrangement alone has no or only marginal impacts on the revenue 
per unit of effort.
We hypothesized that FMOs with either effort coordination or pooling arrange-
ments perform better than those without either of the two schemes. This is partly supported 
by the fact that estimated coefficients for Type B and Type C were positive, but not fully 
supported since Type B was statistically insignificant. Our second hypothesis that FMOs 
with both measures perform better than those only with only either one was almost fully 
supported, as the coefficient for Type A was estimated to be highly significantly different 
from Type D. We say “almost” because (1) Type C was also statistically significant, albeit 
at only 10% level and (2) the t-test among the coefficients of three FMO types revealed 
that none were statistically superior over the other, although Type A was almost significantly 
different from Type B with the p-value of 0.112.
The result that there is no significant difference in revenues per unit of effort 
between Type A and Type C FMOs raises an interesting question as to how exactly Type 
C FMOs operate. If the revenue is pooled but without established central decision-making 
mechanisms (such as committees), how does each individual fisherman in Type C FMOs 
operate? For example, do they operate the same way spatially (i.e., in choosing fishing 
grounds) but simply less intensively? An interview with one Type C FMO manager provides 
hints about answers to these questions. This particular FMO harvests surf clams and the 
purpose of employing the pooling arrangement was to mitigate the members’ incentive 
to race to fish. On each fishing day, revenue is shared only among the members who 
participate in fishing; those who stay on shore are excluded. This eliminates the incentive 
to free-ride by staying on shore. Also, in this fishery there are several fishing grounds 
that are distant from their port, but nonetheless need to be cultivated. With the pooling 
arrangement in place, no individuals have the incentives to fish in these grounds since 
fishing costs are not shared. There are no explicit rules as to how to take turns to harvest 
these fishing grounds, but there is an implicit rule-of-thumb that if you operate in nearby 
fishing grounds for three days you would go to more distant grounds for a day. If a member 
is caught not following this implicit rule, based on peer monitoring, this member will be 
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penalized in the form of reduced share of pooled revenue. In essence, this Type C FMO 
has implicit effort coordination in place. We have no method to verify if this is the norm 
for any of the surveyed Type C FMOs. If it is, however, then the distinction between 
Type A and Type C becomes vague and this would explain why we do not detect significant 
differences in revenue levels between these two FMO types. 
A few observations on the interaction terms are worth mentioning. For Type A 
FMOs it turns out that none of the three attribute variables?membership size, tonnage and 
years since establishment?matters for the members’ revenue per unit of effort. Note that 
the coefficients for average tonnage (0.155) and that interacted with Type A (-0.166), both 
statistically significant, cancel out. Similar outcome is observed for tonnage variable inter-
acted with Type C (-0.998). An interesting result is that the membership size was positive 
and significant for Type B FMOs. Given that the magnitude of fishing inefficiency increases 
with membership size (Cheung, 1970; Gordon, 1954), this in retrospect implies that effort 
coordination has the greatest impact on FMOs with larger membership size.
5.2 Other self-imposed regulations
Next we asked whether the combination of effort coordination and pooling arrange-
ment is solely responsible for higher revenue per unit of effort. There are many other 
types of self-imposed regulations and measures that FMOs can employ and they indeed 
do so (Table 5). We categorized these self-imposed regulations as follows.
1. Marketing: quality control measures such as proper icing and careful release 
from nets, development of new value-added products and branding. 
2. Harvest control: setting TAC and/or individual quota, control daily landing vol-
ume to avoid market glut and fish size and age restrictions. 
3. Operation regulations: restrictions on fishing hours and days, seasonal closure, 
setting no-fishing zones and restrictions on fishing method, fishing gear and 
number of crew on a vessel. 
4. Vessel regulations: restrictions on number of vessels, tonnage and engine power.  
Note that some of above regulations are also imposed by the local or central 
government but in the survey we explicitly asked for self-imposed regulations, 
including those are more stringent than existing government regulations.9 
We first estimated whether these four categories of self-imposed regulations have 
any impact of their own on revenue per unit of effort (Model 1 in Table 6). Results show 
that none has a statistically significant impact. The estimated positive sign for the marketing 
variable is intuitive, as such activities are typically aimed to bring higher revenue. The 
negative sign for the harvest control variable is plausible if the market price did not respond 
enough to reduced landing volume to supplement the loss. 
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Table 5.  Number of FMOs by self-imposed regulations
Regulations Type A Type B Type C Type D Total
Marketing 27 10 4 5 46
Harvest control 25 13 6 8 52
Operation regulations 31 18 6 8 63
Vessel regulations 18 4 2 2 26
Note that the Type A FMO variable remained statistically significant even after 
the addition of self-imposed regulation covariates. Thus, the next question is whether the 
combinations of Type A FMOs and self-imposed regulations have significant impacts on 
revenue per unit of effort. To do so, we introduced the interaction terms of Type A and 
regulation variables. The model is
  (2)
where regulationsil denotes regulation l’s dummy variables, which equals 1 if implemented 
by an FMO i.
The estimation results of equation (2) are shown as Model 1 in Table 6. Results 
show that marketing employed by Type A FMOs has positive and statistically significant 
impacts on revenue per unit of effort. This suggests that marketing practices is likely to 
be effective in increasing the revenue if they are conducted under the effort coordination 
supported by the pooling arrangement. On the other hand, we find that harvest controls 
have negative and significant impacts. Harvest control often involves curtailing the harvest 
volume, which could then lead to the reduction of total revenue.
In the next estimation model, both marketing and harvest control were divided 
into their subcategories to investigate which of these subcategories were most influential 
(Model 2 in Table 6). Marketing variables includes quality control, new product development 
and branding. Harvest control variables includes total catch limit (or TAC), individual catch 
limit (or IQ), supply/landing volume control and size/age restrictions. Each of these sub-
categories was interacted with Type A FMO dummy variable. 
There are several interesting results from Model 2. Firstly, none of the marketing 
sub- categories were significant. A plausible explanation could be that the success of market-
ing depends heavily on the product-type and market conditions on case-by-case basis, thus 
no specific marketing activities can be a silver bullet. The result with the aggregated market-
ing variable in Model 1, in return, implies that Type A FMOs are engaged in different 
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but most effective marketing activities given their market environment.
Table 6.  Heteroskedasticity-robust OLS with interaction terms of Type A FMOs and other self-imposed regulations
Variables
Estimated Coefficient
Model 1 Model 2
FMO typea
Type A 2.059 (2.591)*** 1.697 (1.847)*
Type B 0.561 (0.599) -0.363 (0.333)
Type C 1.609 (1.396) 1.718 (1.100)
Species typeb
Spiny lobster 0.141 (0.193) 0.459 (0.649)
Abalone and turban shell 0.223 (0.501) -0.581 (1.096)
Scallop 1.954 (5.833)*** 1.275 (2.250)**
Asari-clam 0.161 (0.232) -0.076 (0.089)
Other migratory fish -0.248 (0.620) -0.649 (1.575)
Other non-migratory fish 2.307 (3.535)*** 1.575 (2.643)**
Other sedentary species 2.063 (3.801)*** 1.531 (2.274)**
FMO membership size -0.003 (0.319) -0.0001 (0.011)
Average vessel tonnage 0.184 (3.030)*** 0.148 (2.220)**
Years since FMO establishment -0.017 (0.170) -0.002 (0.016)
Type A x membership size -0.003 (0.385) -0.001 (0.128)
Type A x tonnage -0.200 (3.266)*** -0.156 (2.314)**
Type A x years -0.054 (0.424) 0.041 (0.257)
Type B x membership size 0.030 (2.780) 0.024 (2.189)**
Type B x tonnage -0.032 (0.384) 0.012 (0.136)
Type B x years -0.272 (1.937)* -0.162 (0.917)
Type C x membership size 0.017 (1.607) 0.017 (1.295)
Type C x tonnage -0.966 (7.614)*** -0.965 (5.822)***
Type C x years 0.037 (0.262) 0.029 (0.150)
Type A x marketing 1.224 (2.104)**   
Type A x harvest control -1.082 (2.179)**   
Type A x operation regulations -0.199 (0.392)   
Type A x vessel regulations 0.448 (1.064)   
Type A x quality control   -0.666 (1.240)
Type A x new product development   0.964 (1.364)
Type A x branding products   -0.605 (1.167)
Type A x TAC   0.640 (1.153)
Type A x individual quota   1.365 (2.011)*
Type A x supply control   -0.508 (0.763)
Type A x size/age control   -0.811 (1.659)
Operation regulations   0.762 (1.296)
Vessel regulations   -0.064 (0.158)
Constant -1.995 (3.372)*** -2.109 (2.067)**
Adjusted R2 0.559  0.565  
Number of observations 67  67  
Notes : a, Type D FMO is set as the base FMO-type.
b, Surf clam is set as the base species-type.
Absolute t-valuesinparenthesis.Significancelevelsareindicatedby***significantat1%,**5%,and*10%.
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Secondly, results on harvest control subcategory variables show that individual 
quota (IQs) system has positive and significant impact on revenue per unit of effort. If 
the race to fish incentive prevailed prior to IQ being implemented, then with the IQ system 
the landing volume might have decreased, mitigating the flooding of the market and fetched 
higher price, leading to higher revenue per unit of effort. However, here we are examining 
the impact of these self-imposed regulations within the context of Type A FMOs, who 
has both effort coordination and pooling arrangements. Therefore, the incentive to race 
to fish is likely to be less intense, so this scenario is probably unlikely.
Alternative explanation is that IQs could be functioning as a “benchmark” to detect 
shirking members. Because of the presence of the pooling arrangement, FMO members 
are in principle prone to shirking. If a member returns from his fishing trip with a harvest 
volume far below his quota to an extent that it is beyond a reasonable daily fluctuations, 
that could be used as an indicator that he might have been shirking out in the sea. IQs 
can be used to replace physical peer monitoring among the members, which can be useful 
in fisheries where vessels are operating in a dispersed manner.
6. Conclusions
Using the survey data collected directly from a sample of FMO managers across 
Japan, we investigated whether FMOs with fishing effort coordination and pooling arrange-
ments perform better than those without these management arrangements. Theoretically, 
effort coordination will convert the fishing operation from individualistic competition under 
the limited access environment to more sole owner-like operation. Pooling arrangements 
alter the incentives such that individual incentives are aligned with the group incentive, 
thereby further enhancing the possibility of sound and sustainable collective fishery 
management. However, whether and how that translates to higher economic returns, such 
as increased revenue, is an empirical question.
We estimate that a member of Type A FMOs (both effort coordination and pooling 
arrangement) earn significantly higher revenue per unit of effort than a member of Type 
D FMOs (none of the two implemented). Furthermore, in Model 1 Type C FMO (only 
pooling arrangement) members also earn higher revenues per unit of effort than Type D 
FMO members; such was not true for Type B FMO members (only with effort coordination). 
Although this might seem to suggest that pooling arrangements have larger influences on 
revenue than effort coordination, Type B and Type C were not significantly different from 
each other and Type C became insignificant in subsequent estimation models. Thus, our 
hypothesis that FMOs with either effort coordination or pooling arrangement perform better 
KMI International Journal of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
20
than those without the two arrangements was not fully supported. However, the data supports 
our second hypothesis that FMOs with both perform better than those with only either one. 
As a policy implication, does our result indicate that effort coordination and pooling 
arrangement are the essential ingredients, particularly so when put together, for successful 
fishery comanagement? We believe that is the case to a certain extent, but there are other 
conditions that are essential. In particular, effort coordination and pooling arrangements 
are still frameworks to act within their institutions and the question remains as to what 
actions do FMO members take with coordinated effort supported by pooling arrangements.
One answer this study suggests is that active-and well-coordinated?marketing activ-
ities enhance revenues in Type A FMOs. There are several ways to do this depending 
on the market conditions which the industries/communities face. If the fish they catch is 
well known by consumers (e.g., salmon) then an effective marketing strategy could be 
to pursue stringent quality control with the aim of differentiating locally caught fish in 
the market from those caught elsewhere. On the other hand, if the product itself is not 
well known in designated markets (e.g., Chilean sea bass a few years back) then promotion 
marketing can be effective. Taking this one step further, one might be able to create a 
new market by introducing new products. If these activities are sought in fisheries that 
are dominated by small-scale fishers, as was the case in most of the Japanese coastal fish-
eries, then they need to be carried out collectively to be effective. Thus, effort coordination 
and pooling arrangements become essential and complementary institutional frameworks. 
Note that the dependent variable of our model was revenue per unit of effort, 
which was defined as revenue per FMO member per fishing hour. This means that even 
if the revenue per unit of effort is high, one’s total (or annual) revenue level can still 
be low, or not enough to support a livelihood throughout the entire year. Effort coordination, 
particularly rotating fishing grounds and days, could mean that your turn to go out fishing 
comes only once in a while. Pooling arrangements will discourage one to go fishing under 
uncomfortable conditions, such as in bad weather. All of these result in fewer fishing days. 
Indeed, according to Table 2, the number of fishing days per year was much smaller for 
Type A, followed by Type C FMOs.
The possibility of fisheries being lucrative but unable to bring enough total rev-
enues to support the livelihood of fishermen means that income from outside the managed 
fisheries can be critical for successful and sustainable fishery comanagement. This point 
was raised by many FMO managers and local researchers we interviewed. Such outside 
income sources include fisheries other than the managed ones, farming and non-primal 
industries sector jobs such as construction work. 
This is not, of course, necessarily always the case. Like the case of the Pacific 
halibut fishery, a fishery management policy that reduces the race to fish and redirects 
more effort to quality control can achieve both a more lucrative fishery and a prolonged 
fishing season. In such a case, the availability of outside income sources might not be 
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of significant importance. The conclusion of this paper is thus that effort coordination and 
pooling arrangements may not be the most important, but certainly may be one of the 
important factors for successful fishery comanagement.
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Appendix: Regression diagnostics
One of the issues with mail survey is that the researcher does not have a full 
control on how the respondents respond to the questions, as opposed to face-to-face 
interviews. We made every effort to make important aspects of our questions explicit and 
comprehensible with wording and layout of the survey itself. Nonetheless, we still need 
to pay attention to possible measurement error of the data. As such, we devoted much 
time cleaning and checking the data for apparent inconsistencies. Beyond that there is little 
we can do without resorting to ad hoc methods, which is inappropriate. However, one 
would want to avoid the situation where small numbers of erroneous but undetected data 
outliers dominate the model estimates and predictions. For this reason we conducted a 
set of regression diagnostics to detect influential observations and outliers. The strategy 
we pursued was to look for such observations and then take closer looks at the data points 
to determine whether they are legitimately occurring outliers or erroneous data.
                    (a) Type A                                       (b) Type B
(c) Type C
Figure 1.  Partial regression leverage plots for variables Type A, B and Type C
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Following Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), we conducted diagnostics on two main 
issues: i) influential observations on estimated coefficients (the slope of fitted curve) and 
ii) normality assumption of the error term. For the first diagnostic, since the variables of 
our primary interest are FMO-types (A, B and C) we examined if there are any observations 
influencing disproportionately the estimated coefficients of these variables.
Partial regression leverage plots, which visually show the influential observations, 
are presented in Figure 1. The slope of fitted line represents the estimated coefficient for 
the respective variables. In panel b there are no apparent observations suspected of dis-
proportionately influencing the slope of the fitted line. In panel a, an observation to the 
far left is suspected of pulling down the fitted line on that end, thus creating a significant 
and positive slope. In panel c, a data point at upper right-hand corner could be pooling 
up the fitted line on that end, thus creating a significant and positive slope. However, 
DFBETA statistics, which gives numerical values of an observation’s influence on estimated 
coefficients, indicates that these particular observations were below the threshold level (i.e., 
the null hypothesis that this observation is not influential was not rejected). In fact, there 
was no incident where DFBETA statistics were above the threshold, thus none of the 67 
observations in our model was statistically influential. The possibility of the existence of 
multivariate outliers were also tested and rejected.
The results from partial regression leverage plots and other statistics such as 
DFBETA suggest that there is no influential outlier in the regression sample, but clearly 
this does not imply that the data is error-free. However, with 67 observations-not large 
but certainly not small in statistical sense-we can assume that any bias will on average 
cancel out.
                   (a) n = 67                                          (b) n = 66
Figure 2.  Normal probability plot
Normality assumptions of the error term in the model and thus the regression 
residuals, are critical in making inference of the regression results. A moderate departure 
from normality can impair estimation efficiency and the meaningfulness of standard hypoth-
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esis tests. A commonly used method to detect such departures from normality is the normal 
probability plot, where observed cumulative probabilities of occurrence of the standardized 
residuals are plotted against the expected normal cumulative probabilities of occurrence. 
If the regression residuals are truly distributed normally, then the result will be the 45-degree 
line. Thus, departure from this line will indicate that normality assumption is violated.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 is the normal probability plot of our model using its full 
sample (n = 67). Plots are remarkably coincident with the 45-degree line. RSTUDENT sta-
tistics, based on the studentized regression residuals, indicate that there is one observation 
that is above the threshold level of normality assumption. Panel 2b is the normal probability 
plot after deleting this observation (n = 66). As expected, plots are closer to the 45-degree 
line indicating an enhanced validity of normality assumption. 
Now that we have identified the observation that is adversely influencing the nor-
mality assumption, the question is whether we should delete it from our regression sample. 
Deleting observations is certainly a drastic measure and potentially can cause different bias 
and other issues and therefore one would want to avoid that decision whenever possible. 
The key is whether the outcomes regarding the variables of our interest are sensible to 
this single observation. For example, if the signs of estimated coefficients alternate or the 
significance levels fluctuate then we would have a problem. It turns out, however, that 
such was not the case. Qualitative results from regressions with and without this observation 
were identical. We thus decided to retain this observation because i) the departure from 
normality assumption is not severe (Figure 2) and ii) adverse consequence of even smaller 
sample size could be more substantial than the benefit of deleting one observation. 
In sum, we concluded that our empirical model with its full 67 observations can 
be used confidently in making inference on estimation results.
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